Sessions Asks Supreme Court To Define Travel Ban Exceptions
To the Supreme Court is where Attorney General Jeff Sessions went directly on Friday, demanding definition of its June 26 travel ban decision and an instant stay of U.S. District Judge Derrick Watson’s July 13 ruling that altered his initial injunction that blocked Executive Order 13780, which put a temporary travel ban on residents of six Middle Eastern countries and refugees.
That initial injunction was entirely rejected in the Court’s June 26 decision. Watson’s July 13 ruling incredibly tuned down President Trump’s Supreme Court triumph.
On Friday evening, Acting Solicitor General Ken Wall filed a Supreme Court motion asking for the justices to define who is considered a close family member.
“The district court’s interpretation of this Court’s June 26, 2017, stay ruling distorts this Court’s decision and upends the equitable balance this Court struck,” said the DOJ in its motion, listing two particular mistakes in Watson’s decision.
The first, “The district court’s categorical holding that the Order may not be applied to any refugee applicant as to whom the Department of State has obtained a contractual commitment from a resettlement agency — which includes every refugee permitted to enter the United States — effectively eviscerates this Court’s ruling partially staying the injunction as to Sections 6(a) and 6(b),” the DOJ claimed.
The latter, “the district court’s sweeping interpretation of ‘close familial relationship’ to encompass a wide range of distant relatives — including cousins, uncles, and siblings-in-law — effectively eliminates the ‘close’ requirement and has no basis in this Court’s ruling or the INA,” the DOJ went on.
Nevertheless, “respondents pressed further in an effort to strip this Court’s stay of significant practical consequence. The district court [in Hawaii presided over by Judge Watson] adopted both of respondents’ arguments, and denied the government’s request for a stay pending this Court’s review. The government therefore is left to seek this Court’s immediate intervention,” the motion added:
“First, for aliens abroad who seek admission as refugees, this Court held that the suspension in Section 6(a) of the Order and the annual cap in Section 6(b) ‘may not be enforced against an individual * * * who can credibly claim a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States,’” the DOJ said: (emphasis added)
Respondents do not contend that the government has applied Sections 6(a) and 6(b) to refugees who themselves have developed actual, bona fide relationships with U.S. entities. Rather, respondents object that, for every refugee who is likely to enter the United States while Sections 6(a) and 6(b) are in effect, the government has contracted with a resettlement agency to provide assistance to the alien once he eventually arrives in the United States, and the alien has a qualifying bona fide relationship on this basis.
Prior to the refugee’s arrival, however, the relationship is solely between the government and the agency, not between the agency and the refugee. Indeed, the agency typically has no contact with the refugee before his admission.
Because the fact of an assurance does not itself create a relationship between a refugee and a resettlement agency, the government has not treated that fact alone as sufficient to trigger the injunctions.
“To do so (as the district court did) would render the refugee portion of this Court’s decision effectively meaningless,” DOJ maintained.
“Second, for aliens abroad who seek a visa, this Court similarly held that the suspension in Section 2(c) of the Order may not be enforced against an individual with a credible claim of a bona fide relationship to a U.S. person or entity, including “a close familial relationship” with a U.S. individual,” the DOJ argued: (emphasis added)
In interpreting what degree of closeness is required, the government looked to the waiver provision of Section 3(c)(iv) of the Order, which allows waivers for aliens who seek “to visit or reside with a close family member (e.g., a spouse, child, or parent)” in the United States.
That waiver provision in turn reflected the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., governing eligibility for family-based immigrant visas, which are limited to spouses, children, parents, and siblings.
In light of related INA provisions and this Court’s stay decision, the government has further interpreted the phrase “close familial relationship” to include fiancé(e)s and parents- and children-in law.
At respondents’ urging, however, the district court interpreted that phrase also to include grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins, and siblings-in-law. Again, that interpretation empties the Court’s decision of meaning, as it encompasses not just “close” family members, but virtually all family members. Treating all of these relationships as “close familial relationship[s]” reads the term “close” out of the Court’s decision. Moreover, by divorcing the Court’s language from its context — namely, the Order’s waiver provision and the immigration provisions on which it was based — the district court adopted an expansive definition untethered to relevant legislative enactments or Executive action.
The government requested this relief:
The Court should clarify its June 26 stay ruling as set forth above. In the alternative, the Court may construe this motion as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment or as a petition for a writ of mandamus and should grant the petition and vacate the district court’s modified injunction. If the Court would prefer that the government pursue review in the court of appeals in the first instance, the Court should stay the district court’s injunction pending disposition of that appeal. In all events, the Court should grant a temporary administrative stay of the modified injunction pending disposition of this motion.
The argument of the government was especially convincing in dealing with the puzzle of what the court understood by “bona fide relationship” with a “close family member.”
“Respondents in this case (No. 16-1540) are the State of Hawaii and Dr. Ismail Elshikh, a U.S. citizen, who is married to a U.S. citizen, and whose Syrian mother-in-law seeks a visa to enter the United States,” the DOJ stated.
“The specific lines the government has drawn in implementing this Court’s ruling –- like the definition of ‘close family member’ in Section 3(c)(iv) of the Executive Order — are derived from the INA,” the DOJ explained:
Section 201 of the INA defines “immediate relatives” — the “most favored” family-based immigrant visa category, as “the children, spouses, and parents” of U.S. citizens. Step-relationships are included in the INA’s definitions of “child” and “parent.” . . .
In contrast, the district court relied on a strained analogy to cases involving local housing ordinances and grandparents petitioning for visitation rights. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), for example, the Court invalidated limitations on living arrangements of people in the United States, all of whom indisputably had due-process rights.
That hardly supports the proposition that such distant family members have a cognizable stake in whether their alien relatives abroad can enter the country. . .
[T]he government’s definition of close family members is consistent with the factual context for this Court’s stay ruling. . .
Although the Court did not catalogue exhaustively which “close familial relationships” are sufficient to exempt an alien from the Order, the Court left the injunction in place only for persons “similarly situated” to John Doe #1 and Dr. Elshikh.
The Court also explained that “[t]he facts of these cases illustrate the sort of relationship that qualifies,” citing Doe #1’s wife and Dr. Elshikh’s mother-in-law (who is also the mother of Elshikh’s U.S.-citizen wife).
Those types of immediate relationships reflect the reason why the Court determined that certain ties to family members in the United States weigh in favor of leaving the injunction in effect as to such persons: the U.S. relative “can legitimately claim concrete hardship if that person is excluded.”
On the 14th of July, just a day after Judge Watson’s decision, no refugees entered the US, based on the Department of State’s interactive website.